Given an oligopolistic product market, trade unions organized at¯rm level want to coordinate their wage bargaining activities, even if they are self interested. In this paper a situation is analysed, where for some exogenous reasons a complete centralization is not possible. Unions could try to coordinate wage-setting by "wage leadership". The outcome of such "wage leadership" is compared with the outcome of an uncoordinated bargaining and results in higher utilities for all unions. But the resulting wages and employment levels are not symmetrically neither for the unions nor for¯rms.
Introduction
The institutional setting of the wage bargaining process matters. The empirical evidence seems to be clear. The paper of Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988) is a prominent contribution to that issue.
Their thesis: highly centralized and highly decentralized wage bargaining systems perform best.
This means that there is a hump-shaped relationship between the degree of centralization and the macroeconomic performance of a country. The hump-shaped form of this relationship can be explained by externalities. Wage setting in one¯rm or one industry or one country -depending on the degree of centralization -in°uences to some extent the wage setting process of other¯rms, industries or countries. Calmfors (1993) describes several externalities that may occur. A detailed theoretical contribution, based on utility and pro¯t maximization, was published by Moene, Wallerstein and Hoel (1993) . Hargreaves Heap (1994) gives a game theoretic interpretation of bargaining institutions.
At the beginning of the nineties these insights have become components of several textbooks (see Carlin, Soskice (1990) or Layard, Nickell, Jackman (1991) ).
An imperfection of the product market leads to a situation where, in a decentralized bargaining setting, each decision is in°uenced by each other.
1 Oligopoly theory is one way to describe an imperfect product market. Wage bargaining with oligopolistic product markets is analysed, for example, by Dowrick (1989) . He uses a conjectural variation model, but does not incorporate a time structure of the bargaining process. Another example is Dobson (1994) , who analysed a Cournot duopoly with one union for both¯rms and wage bargaining at¯rm level. He deals with the time structure of the two bargainings and investigates if the union is interested in pattern bargaining.
A similar structure is used in this paper. But contrary two Dobson's model, two unions are active (one in each¯rm) in the product market duopoly 2 . If wage rates are not identical for all¯rms, the¯rm who has to pay less gets higher pro¯ts and increases its employment level. So a union that bargains over wages at the¯rm level has to bear in mind relative wages, the own wage rate in relation to wage paid in the competing¯rm, because both wages determine the employment level. So the bargaining in one¯rm has an external e®ect on the bargaining situation in the competing¯rm. For the union it is a positive externality, because goods are substitutes, increasing wages in one¯rm increases the labour demand in the other. It would be a negative one, if the products were complements. In a centralized bargaining this externality would be internalized and resulted in a "better" outcome, so unions would prefer centralized bargaining. Assume that the bargaining partners, caused by some exogenous facts, are not able to organize the bargaining process in a centralized way. Can they internalize the externalities with the help of pattern bargaining? Is "wage leadership" an instrument to coordinate unions wage-policy?
The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 the two-stage structure of the modelthe wage setting stage and the employment setting stage -is described. An uncoordinated setting and a system coordinated by "wage leadership" is analysed. In subsection 2.1 the employment setting is modeled. The¯rms have to decide about output in an oligopolistic framework where the goods of di®erent¯rms are substitutes. This is the starting-point for the analysis of the wage bargaining (subsection 2.2). Two alternative scenarios of wage bargaining (uncoordinated bargaining (2.2.1)) and "wage leadership" (2.2.2)) are formulated. In section 3 two examples of imperfect good markets are presented. In 3.1 a Cournot duopoly is analysed with linear demand and linear production functions, and in 3.2 the "linear city" framework is used. For both examples I derive the solution of collective bargaining in the two bargaining settings. The results are discussed in section 4. Pattern bargaining is not unusual in modern economies, but mostly used to "coordinate"¯rms or sectors with complementary products. So the model does not¯t these situations. But I will argue that increasing international competition makes the coordination of collective bargaining in di®erent countries 1 De la Croix (1994) gives a survey of possible channels of the mutual in°uence. 2 The conclusions of the model also hold for an oligopoly with more than two¯rms.
necessary. For example the deeper integration of european countries within the European Union will change the labour market institutions in all countries, and this means a need of coordination of the bargaining processes in sectors producing substitutes. (For a discussion of the e®ects of European integration on unions see Reder, Ulman (1993) ).
The Model
The model is characterized by the following points: (a) product market is imperfect, organized as an duopoly. Firms produce substitutes, (b) wages are set at the¯rm level, (c) in each¯rm one distinct union is active, and (d) there are two time periods.
Period 1 is the wage setting stage. There is bargaining over wages (a so called "right to manage" model) where the union and the employer are the bargaining partners. If in di®erent¯rms the wages are¯xed at the same time, there is no information about the wages in other¯rms during the bargaining process. Such a situation will be called an "uncoordinated wage setting" system. If there is a sequence of wage setting in di®erent¯rms, one union knows the wage rate payed in the competing¯rm; this system will be called "wage leadership".
Period 2 is the employment setting stage. When wages are¯xed each¯rm calculates its pro¯t and hires workers. Pro¯ts depend on the costs of production and are therefore a function of¯rm's wage rate. But pro¯ts also depend on the degree of competition and therefore on the relative wage.
The labour demand function is derived from the pro¯t function and therefore depends also on all wages. This dependency is crucial to the model. wage setting in the wage setting in the employment decision "wage leader"¯rm "wage follower"¯rm in an imperfect market Table 2 As usual I solve the employment setting stage for all possible wage rates¯rst. These solutions give all the information I need to solve the¯rst stage, the wage setting stage.
Employment Decision
The equilibrium of the duopolistic product market yields product prices, quantities and pro¯ts and gives me the labour demand functions. Each¯rm's cost function depends on the bargained wage rate (the wage rate will be set in the second stage). So one has to solve the product market equilibrium for all possible wages. I will examine two di®erent models of imperfect product markets n section 3 and show that in both models labour demand is not only a function of the own wage, but depends also on the wage rate paid by the competing¯rm.
where i and j are the index for the¯rms. Labour demand is decreasing in the¯rm's own wage and increasing in the wage rate of the competitor. An increase of the own wage shifts up the cost
function. An increase of the wage in the competing¯rm shifts the residual demand for the¯rm's product outwards. Thus pro¯t function and labour demand depend on the wages of both¯rms. Pro¯t and labour demand fall with an increasing wage paid in the own¯rm and with a decreasing wage paid by the competitor.
Wage-Setting
Given labour demand, we can analyse stage 1.
The bargaining solution will be described by a generalized Nash bargaining 3 . The solution can be found by maximizing the following Nash-product:
U (w) : is union's utility function and w is the decision variable. 
Unions can di®er by the weight they attach to the wage rate in the utility function (® i ) and by bargaining power (¯i).
The behavior of¯rms is described by pro¯t maximization. Each¯rm sets the level of employment autonomously in stage 2. Substituting labour demand (equation 1) and pro¯t into the Nash bargaining problem (equation 2) and solving it -remember the wage is the decision variable -one obtains the optimal wage depending on the wage paid by the competitor.
This is a reaction function and describes the optimal wage depending on the competitor's wage. The main result of the analysis is that the optimal reaction is described by an increasing function, with positive slope smaller than one. Wage in¯rm i increases with the wage paid by the competitor, because pro¯t is increasing with the competitor's wage. So the distributable pie expands and the union as well as the employer bene¯t from that.
Moreover, there is a second channel by which employer and union can win: the slope of the reaction function is less than one. This means that the best the bargaining partners can do -as a reaction to a wage increase in the competing¯rm -is to increase their own wage but by less than the competitor.
As a result they get a higher wage and more employment, caused by improved relative costs. The exact position of the reaction function depends on the bargaining power, weight of wages in union's utility and on production and demand function parameters.
Uncoordinated Wage Bargaining
If wages are¯xed simultaneously, neither¯rm can react directly. Thus the wage in the competinḡ rm is exogenously given for all agents.
The solution of wage setting can be described by the intersection of the reaction functions (see the solid lines in¯gure 1). Note that equilibrium wages -like the reaction functions -are functions of the parameters of the demand and production functions, of bargaining power and of the relative weights of the wage in the utility function of both unions. In symmetric situations (the same production functions, unions' utility and bargaining power in both¯rms) wages are equal. If bargaining power di®ers, the stronger union will achieve a higher equilibrium wage.
The next points follow from a comparative static analysis.
² Equilibrium wages increase, when the bargaining power of one union is rising. In¯gure 1 bargaining power of the union 1 increases and shifts the reaction function upwards (dashed line). In¯rm 2, the bargaining power of the union is kept constant. But the equilibrium wages increase in both¯rms, with:
The wage rise following an increase of bargaining power of the¯rm's own union is obvious. The distribution of the pie changes and the stronger union can successfully increase wages. The wage increase caused by additional bargaining power of the competitor's union follows from an improvement of the competitive situation. The cost function of the competitor (¯rm 1) has shifted up. The pro¯t of¯rm 2 increases and the union is able to extract more.
² It follows that equilibrium employment is reduced in the¯rm, where union bargaining power increases. From the union's perspective this reduction is overcompensated by the increasing wage. The reduction of employment is weakened by the competitor's wage increase. In the¯rm with constant union bargaining power employment increases, because the wage rate paid by the competitor increases more than the own wage rate.
² Pro¯t decreases with rising bargaining power of the¯rm's union and increases with rising union power in the competing¯rm (pro¯ts are correlated with employment).
Wage Leadership
The uncoordinated setting di®ers from a bargaining coordinated by "wage leadership" by the information the bargaining partners have. In the "wage leader"¯rm they have to come to terms before bargaining takes place in the competing¯rm. Wage bargaining partners know that their rivals in the competing¯rm will react in a way that is optimal for them. On the other side the bargaining partners of the "follower"¯rm have full information about the wage paid by the leading¯rm.
Without loss of generality let me assume that bargaining takes place in¯rm 1¯rst. Using the equilibrium solution of the employment setting stage the bargaining partners in the leading¯rm have all informations to calculate the reaction function of the bargaining partners in the "follower"
rm. The optimal wage is located on the reaction function of the "follower"¯rm, to the right of the equilibrium point of the simultaneous case.
6 Figure 2 shows the highest indi®erence curve possible for the bargaining partners of¯rm 1. The indi®erence curves for¯rm 1 show combinations of wages paid in the two¯rms with the same value of the Nash-product for¯rm 1. These indi®erence maps are ordered in uprising fashion from left to right, because for each w1 a higher wage in¯rm 2 is better for the bargaining partners of¯rm 1, because employment and pro¯ts are higher.
If we compare a simultaneous setting with a sequential one, we see that equilibrium wages in the sequential scenario are higher for both¯rms. This is a consequence of the positive slopes of the reaction functions. The slope of the reaction functions is smaller than one therefore the wages of the two systems di®er more for the "leader"¯rm. As a result: employment is higher in the "follower" rm.
6 That means I am looking for a subgame perfect equilibrium. Further I assume that this equilibrium is unique. This is a restriction on the reaction functions and is met in the examples of section 3. There is a problem in interpreting a sequence of bargainings as "wage leadership" if these wage rounds are repeated every year. Who is "leader" and who is "follower"? Repeated wage bargaining is necessary because shocks change demand and supply conditions in a unpredictable way. "Wage leadership" can be an instrument for coordinating wage policy only if the time interval between the bargainings of the "leader" and "follower" is short enough, so the probability that a signi¯cant shock occurs in that time interval is small and most likely the two bargainings take place in the same state of the world. Inspection of¯gure 2 shows that without an additional shock wages would converge to the equilibrium of the uncoordinated bargaining situation along the reaction functions (in the w 1 , w 2 diagram of¯gure 2 the reaction function of¯rm 2 is "steeper" than the reaction function of¯rm 1).
The comparative static analysis gives qualitatively the same answers as in the uncoordinated system.
Examples

Cournot Duopoly
In this subsection a Cournot duopoly is analysed as an example of an imperfect product market. The solution of that model can be described by the reaction functions of the two¯rms. Firms can decide about the quantity they produce. Given the demand and cost function, each¯rm can calculate its best response to all possible production plans of its competitor. The output price is a function of the quantities of the homogeneous good produced by both¯rms (P = P (q 1 + q 2 )) and the cost function is a function of each¯rm's own output (C i = C i (q i )).
Each¯rm chooses the output level that maximizes its pro¯t, given the own cost function and the output level of the competitor. The solution of this maximization problem gives the reaction function of¯rm i.
The non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium of this game is determined by the intersection of these Given output levels, pro¯ts and the product price can be calculated. They are functions of both wages (P = P (w i ; w j ) and ¼ i = ¼ i (w i ; w j )).
Let me illustrate this by a simple example with linear demand and a primitive production function.
It should be clear that the result extends to more general models. Assume a linear inverse demand function P = k ¡ a(q i + q j )
and a production technology
(L i is employment in¯rm i, and the only variable factor).
The production plans of the¯rms are given by the solution of the pro¯t maximization problem, where quantity is the decision variable:
The reaction functions are linear functions with negative slopes:
The Cournot equilibrium and therefore employment is given by:
7 The condition for a reaction function with negative slope is: Note that in equilibrium¯rm's pro¯ts and employment are positively correlated.
Wage Setting in an Uncoordinated System
The next step is to formulate wage bargaining. First an uncoordinated situation is analysed. To simplify the model disagreement pay-o®s of unions and¯rms are set to zero. 8 The results are not be a®ected by this restriction in a qualitative way, because an increasing disagreement pay-o® has the same e®ect on wages as an increasing bargaining power.
9 If the union is interested in "real wage" (U = This is also an increasing function in w j. In this setting the resulting wages are higher for both¯rms, compared with the equilibrium of the uncoordinated setting. The wages increase more in the "leading"¯rm, employment and pro¯t are lower. In the following¯rm employment and pro¯t are higher.
"Linear City"
A second example for an imperfect product market is a "linear city" model. In this model¯rms are price setters. Two¯rms produce a homogeneous good with a simple Cobb-Douglas technology exhibiting constant returns to scale. (Y = cK ® L 1¡® ). All consumers are identical except for their "home", their location. They have to incur costs for the transportation of the product from¯rm to "home". Caused by the constant returns to scale property of the production function the¯rms exhibit constant marginal costs (but depending on the wage and interest rate). No¯xed costs are incured and therefore the average costs are also constant.
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, the labour demand function is given by:
(r is the interest rate). We can also calculate the total cost function: The locations of the two¯rms are given by the extreme points of the city. Firm 1 is located at 0 and¯rm 2 at 1.
11 Consumer x incurs quadratic transportation costs tx 2 when he buys at¯rm 1 and
2 when he buys at¯rm 2. 12
The consumers have unit demands, each consumes one or zero unit of the good, depending on the price and the transportation costs. Let s 0 be the gross surplus for each consumer when he is consuming the good. He will buy only if the net surplus s 0 ¡ p ¡ min(tx 2 ; t(1 ¡ x)
The transportation costs parameter t is a measure for the competitiveness of the product market.
With a higher t¯rms have more market power, because consumers do not care as much about price di®erences. 
Consumer x is indi®erent
Given the demand and cost functions,¯rms pro¯ts are
Firms are price-setters, they maximize pro¯ts by selecting prices for their products. The optimal price decision depends on the price of the competitor.
d¼ i dp i
The reaction functions of the price setting game are therefore:
The optimal price rises with the competing price. The concrete value depends also positively on the degree of competition and on the marginal costs of production. A Nash-equilibrium of this game is described by the intersection of the reaction functions.
Equilibrium prices depend on the cost structure of the production processes and on transportation costs. It is important to note that the equilibrium price of a¯rm's product does not only depend on it's own marginal costs but also on the costs of the competitor.
When¯rms have set their prices, we can calculate their output using the demand functions.
To be positive the restriction k i · k j + 3t must hold. Residual demand and therefore labour demand (equation 21) decreases with¯rm's own wage and increases with the wage paid by the competitor.
The same is true for pro¯t, as long as the above inequality is valid.
The overall output is given by one, because gross surplus is assumed to be high.
Wage Setting in an Uncoordinated System
Given the solution of the employment (output) setting stage, unions can set wages. As before wage setting occurs at¯rm level. For simplicity let me use here the simple "monopoly union" model.
The wage rate is set unilaterally by the unions, this is equivalent to¯i = 1 in a "right to manage" model. The results in these di®erent models should be similar, but in the monopoly case we can not investigate the e®ects of changing bargaining power. The¯rm can decide over employment after unions have set wages.
Additionally let us assume here that unions simply maximize the wage bills.
A union can calculate the labour demand function and can select the wage rate which maximizes utility.
Substituting equilibrium output (29) Maximizing the wage bill over w i the reaction function that follows is given by:
This function describes the dependency of the optimal wage, given the wage rate paid by the competing¯rm. The wage of¯rm i is an increasing function of the wage paid in¯rm j and is smaller than 1. (The inequality derived by the restriction of non negative quantities in equation 29 is also an inequality restriction on wage di®erences!)
The Nash equilibrium of the game is simply given by the intersection of the two reaction functions:
Thus the wage rate is determined by the transportation costs and technological factors (with given interest rate). An increase of transportation costs increases the product market power of¯rms and therefore unions can get out more. In a competitive market, where transportation costs are zero, the unions can not force through a mark up on competitive wages.
Wage Setting in a "Wage Leadership" System
The situation is di®erent with sequential wage setting. The union that can set its wage after the decision of its rival has the opportunity to react. It will prefer this situation. Assume union 1 is the leader. To solve this model I substitute the reaction function of union 2 into the utility function of union 1. Comparing the resulting equilibrium wages with those of an uncoordinated system (equation 34), it can be easily checked that wages are higher for both¯rms in the wage leadership scenario than in the uncoordinated one. Employment and pro¯ts are lower in the "leading"¯rm and higher in the "following"¯rm, compared with the uncoordinated setting.
Conclusions
Can self interested trade unions, organized at the¯rm level, coordinate their wage policies by "wage leadership", given an oligopolistic product market? In such an environment local bargaining involves externalities whereas a completely centralized bargaining structure would internalize it. If, for some exogenous reasons, a complete centralization is not possible other forms of coordination are needed.
Such a form of coordination could be the introduction of "wage leadership". The wage bargaining will be¯nished in a "leading"¯rm, before other trade unions and¯rms start the bargaining process.
So the "following" bargaining partners can refer to a guiding wage. In this paper it is argued that a "wage leadership" system cannot substitute a complete centralization. "Wage leadership" works in the right direction and the externalities will be internalized to some extent. So there exists an incentive to try it. All unions win! But it involves some asymmetries between the competing¯rms and between the trade unions.
In the paper explicit solutions are derived for two examples of oligopolies, the classical Cournot model and the "linear city" with price setting¯rms. In both models wages are higher in the "wage leadership" setting than in an uncoordinated one, but only with completely centralized bargaining wages reach a maximum. The higher wages, compared with an uncoordinated setting, involve some costs in form of lower employment.
Caused by an asymmetrical increase of the wages the employment levels changes in di®erent ways in the "leading" and "following"¯rms. The "wage leader" looses employment, but the union is more than compensated by the wage increase (if the wage is important for the union in any way). The situation in the "following"¯rm is completely di®erent. Here wages and employment increase. But wages increase less than in the "leading"¯rm and therefore relative costs of production fall. So the competitiveness of the "following"¯rm increases and employment rises. The analysis of pro¯ts shows a di®erent picture. Indeed pro¯ts of the "following"¯rm rise, caused by improved competitiveness, but the "leading"¯rm looses. So¯rm owners will try to avoid being the "leader". But even the unions are treated asymmetrical and it is not obvious what union -"leader" or "follower" -will win more. In the example of a linear Cournot model the bargaining power of the unions is one crucial variable. In many constellations both unions prefer to be "follower", only if one union is relatively strong this union will be the "leader" and no con°ict about timing arises.
Is there any "real life" situation that could be described by such a model? In some european countries collective bargaining is organized in "wage rounds". In Germany the "IG Metall" is informally the "wage leader" (see for example Bispinck (1993) ). In Austria bargaining in the metal sector is also very important and so this sector acts as the "wage leader" for the others (see for example
Traxler (1993)). But this "wage leadership" is di®erent from that described in our model, because the goods produced in di®erent sectors are no substitutes. Thus the external e®ects can di®er from those modeled here. But let me interpret the model as one of international competition. The outcome of collective bargaining in the metal sector of Germany is very important to the bargaining partners in the metal sector of other european countries, because relative wages determine demand to some extent. The increasing competition in the European Union alters the labour market and bargaining institutions and they have to react. But european countries start with considerable di®erences in these institutions and institutions cannot adjust very quickly. A centralization at the european level seems not possible in the short or medium run, and so one way to coordinate at an international level might be the introduction of "wage leadership".
The existence of the described asymmetries makes an instrument for redistribution necessary, otherwise the coordination will fail. But why should such an instrument exist when unions and¯rms cannot centralize the bargaining process in the¯rst place? It is therefore hard to believe that "wage leadership" will be used as a coordination method, although an implicit (not coordinated) "wage leadership" will be in action in future.
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